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In remarking that "war is merely the continuation of policy by other means," Clausewitz unambiguously defined the
conduct of war--the use of military force--as a means for a state to achieve policy and not an end in itself.[1] He
implied, but did not state, that other means must also exist. These other means as well as the use of military force
emanate from the four elements of national power: military, economic, political, and social. What Clausewitz did not
discuss in his treatise On War were the circumstances under which war becomes the correct means with which to
pursue policy--the imposition or dominance of one state's national interests over those of another state. He never
answered the question: When is it proper to use military force in the pursuit of national interests?
The answer to that question is largely dependent upon the nature and importance of the national interest being pursued.
Many authors have described what the national interests of the United States have been throughout our history and
what they should be now, since the collapse of the Soviet Union. A reasonable approach to the correct application of
military power does not require a synthesis of those many discussions. Rather, a simple national interest model, the
National Interest Matrix introduced by Donald E. Nuechterlein in 1979, will suffice. Mr. Nuechterlein used four basic
interests that could apply to any state: defense of homeland, economic well-being, favorable world order, and
promotion of values.[2] Additionally, he introduced four levels of intensity with which states view their interests.
These were:
Survival Issues: The very existence of the nation-state is in jeopardy, either as a result of overt military attack on
its own territory or from the imminent threat of attack should an enemy's demands be rejected. . . .
Vital Issues: Serious harm will likely result to the state unless strong measures, including the use of conventional
military force, are employed to counter an adverse action by another state or to deter it from undertaking a
serious provocation. . . .
Major Issues: The political, economic, and ideological well-being of the state may be adversely affected by
events and trends in the international environment which thus require corrective action in order to prevent them
from becoming serious threats. . . .
Peripheral Issues: The well-being of the state is not adversely affected by events or trends abroad, but the
interests of private citizens and companies operating in foreign countries are endangered.[3]
Nuechterlein developed the matrix to provide "a new conceptual framework whereby scholars and policymakers can
be more precise in their use of terms and more accurate in relating national interests to foreign policies."[4] Thus, the
matrix will provide a good framework for the discussion of a significant element of foreign policy, the use of military
force. Figure 1 shows a sample matrix.
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Adapted from Donald E. Neuchterlein, America Recommitted: United States National Interests
in a Restructured World (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1991), pp. 19, 26.

Figure 1. The 1986 US bombing of Libya as an example of the National Interest Matrix.
In its definitions of the different intensities with which states view their national interests, the Nuechterlein matrix
establishes some baseline criteria for the use of military force in support of survival and vital issues. These criteria
reflected the prevailing US foreign policy approach to the use of force during the period between the end of World
War II and the end of the Vietnam War. Unfortunately, "Internationalism"--the belief that the security and prosperity
of every place on earth was vital to America's own--was the dominant foreign policy view during the same period.[5]
The net result was that the United States repeatedly identified any aggression by the Soviet Union or the potential
spread of communism as an intolerable threat to its own security even if no otherwise vital or survival interests were at
stake. The US military involvement in Vietnam was the classic example of this approach to determining when to use
military power.[6]
Failure to achieve US policy objectives in Vietnam through the use of military power led to analysis and speculation
about why the failure occurred and under what circumstances the United States could effectively employ military
power in the future. In remarks to the Washington Press Club on 28 November 1984, then-Secretary of Defense
Caspar Weinberger proposed the following six criteria to determine the conditions under which the use of military
force was warranted:
The United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is
deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies. . . .
If we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly and with
the clear intention of winning. . . .
If we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military
objectives. . . .
The relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed--their size, composition, and
disposition--must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary. . . .
Before the United States commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we will have
the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress. . .
The commitment of US forces to combat should be a last resort.[7]
Mr. Weinberger used these criteria--the so-called "Weinberger Doctrine"--to address the primary reasons that
knowledgeable people agreed had led to the US failure in Vietnam. He continued to assert the idea, pervasive during
the Cold War, that military force could only be used in pursuit of vital national interests. No doubt this idea seemed
relevant, since any use of military power in those times carried the threat of superpower confrontation and escalation to
war in which the very survival of the nation could be at risk. Additionally, Weinberger proposed in his sixth criterion
that the use of military force be a policy option of last resort. This limited the available means with which the United
States could initially pursue policy. However, in the Cold War context, these six criteria or tests were meant to prevent
the United States from being caught up in a "gradualist incremental approach" to the use of military power--an
approach that more often than not led to insufficient use of force.[8]

The Weinberger Doctrine held prominence as the definitive yardstick for measuring the application of military force
until 1991. Two events, Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, then

changed the foreign policy playing field and rules. The first, Desert Shield and Desert Storm, in conjunction with two
earlier short, successful military operations (Just Cause and Urgent Fury), altered the US populace's perception of the
military. Collectively these operations changed the image of the use of military force from the painful, ineffective
policy means of Vietnam to a rapid, decisive weapon to insure attainment of US national interest objectives. At the
same time, dissolution of the Soviet Union destroyed the Cold War threat of superpower confrontation that had
pervaded the previous 40 years. With these changes, revision of the criteria for the use of military force became
inevitable.
Several prominent members of the US defense establishment entered the discussion about how and when the United
States should employ its military forces. General Colin Powell, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, presented
the military view of four propositions on when it is appropriate to use force:
Force should be used only as a last resort. . . .
Military force should be used only when there is a clear-cut military objective. . . .
Military force should be used only when we can measure that the military objective has been achieved.
Military force should be used only in an overwhelming fashion.[9]
These criteria are actually quite similar to the six criteria of the Weinberger Doctrine. Both sets clearly state that the
use of military force should be a policy means of last resort, and then only in cases where military objectives can be
clearly identified and defined. Also, though not stated in the same terms, the concept of only using overwhelming force
appears to be a synthesis of Weinberger's criteria of only fighting to win and properly sizing the forces to meet the
military objective. Furthermore, the concept of using overwhelming force alters the nature and duration of guaranteed
public and congressional support for committing US forces. Under such conditions, operations involving overwhelming
and rapid application of military force would theoretically be completed before support could erode.
The most notable difference, and it is quite significant, is the removal of the criterion for the use of military force in
support of policy that is vital to US national interests. This clearly signals the end of the Cold War confrontation and
the threat of any military enterprise escalating into a superpower survival issue. Nonetheless, retention of the idea that
the use of military force is the policy means of last resort continues to limit the full, flexible use of all elements of
national power in pursuit of national interests.
Former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, while a member of the US House of Representatives, commented in 1992 that
General Powell's criteria do not go far enough in describing the potential uses of military force in the post-Cold War
era. He stated it is "clear that this brand new world of ours is a world of turmoil and agitation. And that agitation has
provoked calls for the use of military force in a whole range of circumstances that don't fit the mold."[10] Aspin thus
took issue with the idea of the use of force as a policy means of last resort. He evidently believed that such a constraint
would limit the military's usefulness in achieving policy objectives to only extreme cases. Such conditions could lead
to the military becoming like nuclear weapons in the Cold War--important, expensive, but not useful.[11]
As Secretary of Defense, Aspin described his preferred use of military power as the "limited objective school" (in
contrast to the "all-or-nothing school" reflected in General Powell's four criteria). The heart of this limited objective
school is the issue of compellence--"the use of military force against an adversary to influence his behavior
elsewhere."[12] Though not specifically addressed, there does not appear to be much disagreement on the other three
criteria for the use of military force. Regardless of the scope of the military operations envisioned in support of foreign
policy, it is possible to define the military objectives clearly and measurably. Finally, the application of military power,
even in the pursuit of limited objectives, could (and should) be overwhelming, to insure rapid success and reduce the
likelihood of friendly casualties.
Former President George Bush also expressed his views on the appropriate application of military power. In a speech
to West Point cadets as he neared the end of his term in office, he elaborated his beliefs on the use of military force.
He discounted the need for a fixed set of criteria to determine the use of military force, stating that each case is unique
and requires judgment. Further, "to adopt rigid criteria would guarantee mistakes involving American interests and
American lives and would give would-be troublemakers a blueprint for determining their own actions."[13] In spite of
this belief, President Bush described at least four principles that should inform the decisions to use military force:

The relative importance of an interest is not a guide. Military force may not be the best way of safeguarding
something vital, while using force might be the best way to protect an interest that qualifies as important, but
less than vital. . . .
Using military force makes sense as a policy where the stakes warrant, where and when force can be effective,
where no other policies are likely to prove effective, where its application can be limited in scope and time, and
where the potential benefits justify the potential costs and sacrifice.
A desire for international support is not a prerequisite for acting, although acting in concert with allies and
friends is preferred. . . .
It will be essential to have a clear and achievable mission, a realistic plan for accomplishing the mission, and
criteria no less realistic for withdrawing US forces once the mission is completed.[14]
Generally, with these views, President Bush's criteria resemble Aspin's "limited objective" school. With such phrases
as "real leadership requires a willingness to use military force, and force can be a useful backdrop to diplomacy, a
complement to it, or, if need be, a temporary alternative," and "selective use of force for selective purposes,"[15] Bush
clearly believed that the use of military force is one of the means available at any time to achieve national interests, not
only the means of last resort.
Post-Desert Storm applications of military power seem to fit the limited objective school of thought rather than the allor-nothing school. This is not overly surprising since the former is the school most closely aligned with the beliefs of
President Bush. Clearly, the idea that use of military force is a policy option of last resort is no longer a restraint for
policymakers. Additionally, limiting the use of military force to the pursuit of only vital national interests seems no
longer to be a consideration. Before developing a model for future applications of force, it is important to understand
the environment in which nations presently pursue their policies.

Without a doubt, the world has changed significantly in the past few years. For the first time in this century, none of
the most powerful states of the world seems to harbor aggressive intent. The fear of forceful domination on a global
scale appears to have ended for the foreseeable future. Great-power and regional competition will continue, but for
other than military dominance: for political influence over issues that concern state interests, for market share and
technological leadership that affect state power and prosperity.[16] Military power is losing its importance as a means
of achieving national interests and has given way to economic power as the preeminent element of national power. The
new world order will see military-political states lose their leadership position to trading states.[17] In such a world
order, the survival interests of the United States will not generally be at risk even though at least two countries, Russia
and China, will continue to possess the capability to attack the United States with nuclear weapons well into the next
century. Most vital interests will deal with protection from the loss of economic power, prosperity, and technological
advantage. In these areas, the use of military force will have minimal usefulness.
In what instances then, will policymakers seek to use military force? The apparent answer is that the United States will
now consider using military force in pursuit of national interests with only "major" and "peripheral" levels of intensity.
Of course, the strategic nuclear deterrent will remain as long as other countries in the world possess the capability to
launch attacks against the US homeland. And US forces will undoubtedly intervene should any country attempt
through military aggression to attack the sovereignty of one of its allies. With these exceptions, which have little
likelihood of occurring in the near future, military force will most likely be committed in support of national interests
in the bottom half of Nuechterlein's issues hierarchy.
The intervention in Somalia provides an example of such policy. Vital national interests are not at stake in that
country; promotion of American values and a favorable world order, both peripheral interests, are at stake. Under the
circumstances and conditions that existed in Somalia, however, application of military power was probably the only
option that had a reasonable prospect of producing favorable results at acceptable cost. Unfortunately, the initial
intervention into Somalia brought back memories of intervention into Vietnam, particularly since there was no clear
definition of the desired end state upon which to base the withdrawal of American troops from the country. The
emergence of a rogue leader, the onset of armed opposition to UN forces, and the expanded mission prescribed for UN
forces in UN Security Council Resolution 814 serve to highlight the immaturity of end-state planning concepts and
processes.

Military capability, including the prospect of armed force, could be used to preserve the prevailing world order--to
promote world congeniality--or to insure American economic access to important trading areas. In the first instance,
US presence in stable military alliance structures in Europe and the Pacific assures neighbors of Germany and Japan
that those two countries are not disposed to autonomous military policies that could threaten regional interests.[18] In
the second case, American leaders appear to be trading continued support of the US nuclear deterrent in Europe for
German leadership support of American economic presence in European markets.[19] The evident trend, therefore, is
to use military force in a wide range of policy options, much as explained by President Bush as he left office and
supported by former Secretary Aspin, whose defense views were presumably supported by President Clinton.

What considerations should be met before the use of military forces becomes the policy means of choice? The
following five elements offer a preliminary answer.
First, generally speaking, the intensity of the national interest being pursued should have little effect on the
decision. The obvious exception is the situation in which the survival of the nation is at stake and the nation must fully
apply all aspects of national power--military, economic, political, and social--to insure the welfare of its citizens and
continuation of the state. In most other cases, once policymakers decide that the United States must use some element
of its national power to achieve a foreign policy objective, they can decide on the use of military force if it offers the
best benefit-to-cost/risk option for the situation. The first consideration calls for the selective use of force for selective
purposes.
Second, of great importance for any use of military force is the unambiguous statement of clear, attainable, and
measurable military objectives whose attainment will satisfy the pertinent policy objectives. Not only does this permit
the military to compose a force appropriate to the mission, but it also establishes the parameters for an end-state
condition that signals the end of military force application and the withdrawal of American forces.
Third, military force obviously becomes the option of choice if all other options have failed or if no other policy
option offers reasonable prospect of success.
Fourth, in most instances the United States should opt to use force within the framework of an international
consensus, even if it is only an implicit consensus, especially in cases where the interest being pursued is not a vital
US interest.
Fifth, military force application decisions should not contain unrealistic limitations. To achieve the quick,
decisive, and low-casualty results that have come to characterize US military operations, overwhelming force at the
point of decision is a prerequisite. This consideration brings together the means and ends issues inherent in strategic
planning and should help to clarify the principles and processes of end-state planning and management.
The debate about the proper size and use of the US military will surely continue for some time as policymakers try to
balance competing demands and deal with diverse situations. The Cold War exacted a high price from both
superpowers: the Soviet Union dissolved and the United States experienced neglect and erosion of its own internal
strengths. While major-power politics may shift to the politics of economics and technology development in a unipolar
setting, we should not delude ourselves about the durability of turmoil, agitation, and aggression. Only some of the
terms of reference for the application of military power have changed.
As the remaining global military power, the United States has a responsibility to the world and to itself to learn to use
its military power judiciously. The country cannot and will not sustain the continuous economic drain, nor could the
military survive the debilitating effects that would result, from trying to use the military as the solution to every crisis
that erupts in the world. The country must adopt a strategy of selective military engagement that most fully supports
the pursuit of national interests, regardless of interest intensity but mindful of benefit versus cost. The five
considerations presented above will support the development of such a strategy.
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